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Abstract: Many public and private sector projects, such as hydropower dams or mines, trigger forced
population displacement but fail to resettle people sustainably and instead cause their impoverishment. Social
science research has found that one root cause of such failures and of impoverishment is asset dispossession
and the insufficient financing of resettlement. Most governments, however, state that (1) compensation alone
is sufficient for restoring the income and livelihood of those displaced, and (2) resources to supplement
compensation with additional financing are not available. The author critiques and rejects these positions. He
offers a theoretical analysis of the limits and flaws of compensation payments for expropriated assets, and
argues that resources are available for supplementing compensation with financial investments for resettlers’
development. The sources for supplementary financing are the economic rent (windfall profits) generated by
natural resource projects such as hydropower or mining and the regular stream of benefits generated by all
projects that require resettlement. Further, the author argues that financial investments in resettlers’ welfare are
indispensable and that benefit sharing is feasible. Therefore, both should become basic principles of
resettlement legislation and practice. In addition to theoretical analysis, the author documents with empirical
evidence that some countries (China, Brazil, Canada, Columbia and Japan) already make investments
additional to compensation for post-displacement reconstruction. The author sums up his argument in these
key points:
(1).Compensation alone cannot prevent the impoverishment of resettlers and cannot in itself restore and
improve their livelihoods;
(2).Additional financing is needed for direct investments in resettlement with development;
(3).Compensation levels must be increased;
(4).Financing resources are available in most cases for investing in resettlers’ development, but
allocation of investments depends on the political will of governments and project owners;
(5).Firm opposition to displacement and under-compensation is growing in many countries and the
strength of resettlers’ demands and political opposition does influence allocation levels;
(6).Mechanisms for benefit sharing and transfer are known and effective and these mechanisms can be
adjusted to different country and economic sector conditions;
(7).The introduction of benefit-sharing rules requires legislative enactment for robust application.
Key words: compensation; hydropower dams; displacement; resettlement; risks; poverty; impoverishment;
benefit sharing
1 Introduction
This paper discusses several ideas that are moving to the forefront of the international
debates around development-caused population displacements and resettlement. These ideas
are examined by economists, sociologists, engineers, and legal specialists in a new book,
which in its very title asks a stark question: Can Compensation Prevent Impoverishment?
(Cernea and Mathur 2008).
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Challenging whether compensation can – or cannot – prevent impoverishment reaches
deep into the heart of development policy, practice, political economy, law and ethics.
Compensation is presumably the basic remedy for eminent domain dispossession and forcible
displacement. But if this remedy fails to prevent people’s impoverishment, where should
responsibility be placed and accountability demanded? And what are the alternatives for
avoiding impoverishment?
There is a growing awareness that the majority of projects that displace people, including
projects sponsored by international agencies or by private sector corporations, end up failing
to resettle them equitably. The outcomes of most development-caused forced displacements
and resettlements (henceforth, DFDR) leave a disgraceful stain on development itself,
conflicting with its rationale, objectives and morality. But the situation varies across the
developing world. This article brings evidence from many developing countries of the severity
of such issues. In China, major policy measures were adopted in the last two decades, and
particularly in 2006, to correct past errors and substantially increase both compensation
payments and financial investments in “resettlement with development”. Also, data on legally
enacted benefit-sharing mechanisms in hydropower projects in some industrialized countries
(Canada, Japan and Norway) support our argument.
Our ultimate conclusion is that profound reform in how involuntary resettlement is
currently conceived, conducted and financed in most developing countries is indispensable.
Such reform must begin with the economic and financial foundations of planning for
displacement and resettlement.
2 Flawed compensation and under-financing: An essential cause
of resettlement failure
What are the root causes of this impoverishment that triumphs again and again over all
official and project promises that forced resettlement will not result in impoverishment?
In most countries, compensation is used by the state as the virtually single financial tool
for handling expropriation, displacement and resettlement. In official vocabularies,
compensation is vested with almost mythical virtues, as if it were able to cure all the ills of
uprooting, dispossession, emotional pain, expropriation and economic impoverishment
inflicted by forced displacement. In real life, however, compensation reveals itself to be both
impotent and misleading: it is unable to perform the restorative miracles with which it is
officially and rhetorically credited. Compensation is flawed and reconstruction is
under-financed. The revealing fact is that numerous projects that do pay compensation fail to
restore livelihoods and leave people worse off. This is why we argue that a basic and recurrent
cause of failure in DFDR in most developing countries is financial.
Without any doubt, compensation for expropriated land and assets is economically
justified, legally obligatory, and indispensable. But it is not capable of achieving what it is
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assumed to achieve: livelihood restoration and improvement. It leaves a financial gap, unfilled
by other financing sources.
Compensation has been found again and again, in study after study, to be not only poorly
conceived and implemented, but also financially insufficient – in short, not up to its task of
restitution and of actually “compensating” in the full sense of this term (Fernandes and
Thukral 1989; McDowell 1996; Drèze et al. 1997; Picciotto et al 2001; McDonald 2006;
Jayawardene 2008). By its nature, as defined in economics, compensation is neither a
“benefit” to displaced oustees nor an “investment” in their development (as it is often falsely
claimed to be): it is only an (incomplete) restitution for what is taken away from those
displaced.
The scholarly critique of compensation theory, of its financial insufficiency, and of its
operational dysfunctionalities (Cernea 1999, 2008) has sharpened in recent years, striving to
pierce the deafness of officialdom. Such critique has multiplied particularly in India, more at
the level of empirical observation and reporting, however, than at the level of theoretical
deconstruction and critique.
In their book on India’s ongoing development, Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen noted,
without elaborating, that “it has been possible for large development projects to displace
millions…over the years, without any compensation worth the name and without anyone
taking much interest in them in the corridors of power”. In addition to being functionally
insufficient from a strictly financial viewpoint, even if it were calculated objectively,
compensation is further vitiated by corrupt subtractions and distortions during delivery, as
aptly described by Mathur: “Poor people don’t get in their hands the full amount of
compensation for their properties, meant to aid them in getting back on their feet. Rampant
corruption hits the poorest the hardest. Government agencies are not known for their integrity
in seeing that the rightful claimants get their due amounts promptly…” Even in land
acquisition for private sector projects, government’s unnecessary interference in transactions
that should be market-based, between a willing buyer and a willing seller, results in a much
diminished amount of compensation for the small landowners, largely accounting for their
impoverishment.
Worldwide research on DFDR is increasingly focusing on revealing the impoverishment
risks to which displaced populations are exposed and on the need for targeted counter-risk and
reconstruction strategies (Mathur and Marsden 1998; Cernea 1997, 2000; Pandey 1998;
Downing 2002; Schmidt-Soltau 2003; Scudder 2005; Guha 2007). During the last decade, the
widespread use of the IRR model and methodology in DFDR research worldwide has
generated a new and enormous body of empirical data confirming that impoverishment is the
dominant outcome for displacees in the overwhelming majority of cases reported in the
scientific literature (Mahapatra 1999; Scudder 2005; de Wet 2006). The findings consistently
converge around paradigmatic, recurrent risks and pauperization outcomes, rather than on
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idiosyncratic, accidental occurrences. One key factor of such pauperization is the political and
policy stance of many governments, which, in various ways, deliberately maintain
compensation payments at low levels, including through state interference in land acquisition
by private sector projects, and infringe on people’s rights.
Amartya Sen (Sen 2007) has recently weighed in substantively on this key issue, with an
acid critique of the “big mistakes” in the thinking and action of the West Bengal government
in the case of the Singur and Nandigram SEZ projects. Sen’s critique raises a key theoretical
and policy objection against the non-market, noncompetitive way in which land-compensation
levels are determined now. In his words, “Where there is a mistake in the government’s
thinking, and I think it is a big mistake of a tactical kind, is not to recognize that if this land
were available for industry in general, and not just for the Tatas, the value of the land would
have been much greater. While the compensation paid is greater than the value of the land seen
as agricultural land, the compensation paid by the government is less than what the value
would have been had it been free for competition with industries. If you are part of the market
economy, then you have to take into account what the value of the land would have been had it
been freely available for industry…I think it is a mistake, an honest mistake and it can be
corrected in the future.”
The theoretical and policy implications of Sen’s critique converge in suggesting the need
to reform both the thinking and the practices of compensation. Sen asks the state to promote
competition among industries for the land they need, and points also to industries’ ability to
increase the financing above what is the conventional norm in current by-the-state
compensation practice.
The financial insufficiency of compensation as a source for restoring and improving
livelihoods is by now well known, better documented empirically and more recognized than
ever before (Cernea and Mathur 2008). Absent change, it is fully predictable that the outcomes
will continue to be de-capitalization and impoverishment, with countless people becoming
worse off. To continue a financing pattern based on compensation alone means largely to
continue financing the certainty of repeated failure and further impoverishment. Financing is
in itself a factor of such paramount importance for achieving economically sustainable
resettlement that, when flawed, it causes failure, even if other necessary factors of success are
present. Certainly, money alone wouldn’t solve all resettlement’s problems either. But the
absence of adequate financing foreordains failure by definition. This makes it indispensable, as
the author will argue further in this paper, to mobilize additional financing sources for carrying
out DFDR; indeed, financing can be complemented by a fraction of project benefits to
supplement compensation payments.
3 Investment financing for sound resettlement
Financing for achieving success in resettlement does not only require radical reform of
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the current norms and practices of compensation as restitution. It also requires, as the author
will argue, making proactive financial investments in the reconstruction of resettlers’
economic and material income basis.
The sharing of project benefits, as documented below, has become in a number of
countries another financial instrument used towards securing the resources for such
investments in reconstruction post-displacement. The conceptual rationale and the legal and
practical mechanisms available for such benefit sharing are the main subjects of the present
paper. Avoiding altogether or reducing displacement whenever possible remains always the
desirable and paramount goal. But when compulsory displacement becomes unavoidable,
these mechanisms are crucial for placing the people who are physically or economically
displaced on a new and economically robust productive foundation.
Post-displacement reconstruction – in particular, its complex economic anatomy – is still
little studied in the resettlement literature. Much more is known from the
socio-anthropological literature about how displaced people become impoverished than about
how they are coping and trying to overcome and rebuild their dismantled economic and
income base. Endowing development projects that cause displacement with the budgeted
financial resources needed to correct the harm through sustainable resettlement is nothing
more than a normal, elementary prerequisite for creating the capacity to do the job. Yet
although this is a fundamental premise, project economists underestimate it. Most
Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) are not supported by an economic feasibility analysis
capable of examining whether the rehabilitation promised by RAPs will or will not lead to
economic recovery. The budgets included in RAPs (when such budgets are attached – often
they are missing altogether) are not the result of a professional economic and financial
analysis, as project appraisal doesn’t mandate it. Thus, the projects that forcibly dispossess
people of vital productive assets and dismantle their existing economic systems are seldom
equipped by the project sponsors with sufficient financial resources to rebuild the livelihoods
they dismantle. Even the best manager of a resettlement project component would not be able
to produce miracles and prevent the severe impoverishment that looms over those displaced if
not given adequate financial means (Cernea 1999, 2000, 2008). Analysis of the compensation
principle and practices cannot but conclude that compensation is structurally insufficient to
achieve full restoration and is even less capable of generating improvements in livelihoods.
Empirical findings show beyond any doubt that the delivery of compensation is subject to
structural dysfunctions, diverting practices, delays, etc., leaving the goal of oustees’
reintegration and reconstruction unachieved.
Moreover, our analysis of a large number of resettlement action plans has identified the
specific type of missing resources: RAPs tend to list the compensation resources allocated for
restorative activities, but in the vast majority of cases are devoid of allocations for investment
in development activities for the resettlers. The resettlement policy statements of the World
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Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), African Development Bank (AfDB), and other
development agencies are not explicit about investing in resettlers’ development over and
above the payment of one-off compensation for lost assets. They remain vague in this respect,
far from being directive towards financing resettlers’ development. As a result, insufficient
financing not only chronically ruins resettlers’ livelihoods, but also undermines the total
economic performance of projects with resettlement components. Conversely, better
resettlement financing could result in overall better performing projects.
Fortunately, however, new experiences in some countries also reveal the seeds of
alternative approaches. Moreover, these are not piece-meal or accidental acts, but rather
significant macro-societal measures. They include adoption of legislation creating adequate
financial capacity for resettlement. Such approaches suggest valid alternatives to current
under-financing patterns in other countries as well.
4 “Where would the resources come from?”
When the question of allocating more resources for resettlement is raised, the official
responses are either outright negative or skeptical: “We pay compensation. There are no other
financial resources for the resettlers”; or “Where would the resources for more funding come
from?
Certainly, resource scarcity is a real constraint. But is it a constraint that cannot be
overcome?
Financing shortages during resettlement implementation are more often an artifact of
inadequate pre-project cost calculations for this component, and of initially unrealistic budgets,
than of absolute resource scarcity (Pearce and Swanson 2008). Undervaluation of losses and
underestimates of resettlers’ forthcoming reconstruction costs coalesce into under-allocations
of financing at projects’ start. This initial under-budgeting is hard to correct during
implementation, even if RAP implementers realize that initially allocated resources are not up
to their complex tasks.
Despite constraints and scarcity, there are ways to mobilize the necessary financial
resources to do the resettlement programs well and achieve resettlement with development.
Economic theory points to the significant resources generated by the very projects that impose
the displacement.
As long as the mindset of decision makers and financial planners is entrenched in the
belief that compensation is all that is due and needed for resettlers to recover, we can expect
only (1) a limited up-front budget allocation, and (2) attempts to push this allocation to the
lowest level tolerable. This belief is cultivated and reinforced by the long-persisting (but never
actually proven empirically on a large scale) assumption – originating in obsolete economic
theory – that compensation alone is sufficient for income restoration.
We challenge this belief as unconfirmed in practice and mistaken. Many evaluations of
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project outcomes have empirically proven that these assumptions are incorrect (Picciotto et al.
2001). For a policy to succeed, the means for achieving its objectives must be commensurate
with these objectives, at the level necessary to render the objectives feasible. Furthermore, a
basic economic principle, germane to the circumstances of expropriation and forced
(non-market) acquisition, is that project costs should not be externalized. Yet such selective
externalization occurs (Daly 2004) whenever the financial means are short of covering all
costs imposed on the displaced people, leaving them worse off than they were before the
project.
Consequently, resource allocation should be keyed to the pursuit of the policy’s
objectives in resettlement. The economic feasibility analysis of resettlement plans and the dial
of the budgeting balance must be set not just on restitutionary compensation, but also on
reaching the policy goal of livelihood restoration and improvement. Then, the allocation of
required means would be much larger from the outset.
Compared to the mega-costs of large-scale projects, the outlays for resettlement remain a
small fraction of the total budget. Resettlers claim that if the public sector has resources to
finance the physical infrastructure built by the project for the general good, it is only right to
allocate a sufficient amount for economically restoring those whose livelihoods are put at
grave risk. This is a powerful argument, which can be discounted only at the peril of moral
discredit and political instability.
5 Economic rent as potential resource for resettlement
Returning to the question of where the resources would come from to increase the
financing of resettlement, we will refer to the experience of several countries that found novel
solutions. We believe that these approaches are replicable.
In essence, these solutions revolve around using (1) the windfall economic rent generated
by the exploitation of natural resources, and (2) a fraction of those projects’ normal benefits to
reconstruct resettlers’ livelihoods at higher than pre-displacement levels.
These solutions are not limited to hydropower projects: the rationale applies to other
categories of projects as well, especially in the extractive industries.
The economic theory of rents supports the argument that certain categories of projects,
usually unfeasible without population displacements, also generate surplus (or windfall)
benefits. Economic rent is defined in classic economic theory as a surplus return over and
above the value of the invested capital, materials, labor costs, and other factors of production
employed to exploit natural resources. This surplus return can be used for overcoming
resource scarcity in financing resettlement.
A World Bank study dedicated to “measuring and apportioning rents from hydroelectric
power developments” (Rothman 2000) examines several rent-capture mechanisms and the
reallocation of rent, drawing on a large body of economic literature. Though it was not written
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for the purpose of resettlement financing, the study speaks to the issues we address here about
allocating a percentage of the economic rent towards better funding the population dislocated
– and to be resettled – by the same projects.
Projects that exploit natural resources, such as mining projects, oil and gas projects,
hydropower projects, and others, secure access to lands rich in natural resources (through
displacement, expropriation or free market purchase). This way, such projects buy the
opportunity to harvest a substantial economic rent, additional to the average returns in other
sectors. The higher the quality of a resource compared to the same resource at a different
location, the higher the rent that can be captured by exploiting the former. Yet the
lower-quality resource would still yield an economic rent over normal returns to capital and
entrepreneurship.
Once such rent is captured through various mechanisms, the questions relevant to our
argument here are: How should the surplus be used? Is it appropriate to redistribute it evenly
to the population at large? Or should some particular groups be allowed to benefit with priority
from its capture?
The only logical answer is: Given the asset-dispossession and de-capitalization that occur
when such projects are built, it is fair and necessary that populations that lose their livelihood
should have a priority call on such resources. The state and governments are ultimately those
who decide on allocation priorities and on the proportions in which the captured rent is
allocated.
In addition to economic rents, another financing source upon which the novel practices
emergent in resettlement have begun to rely is the project’s normal stream of benefits.
Regardless of sector, each successful project has its expected stream of benefits, even if it does
not capture an economic rent from natural resources extraction. The avenue of benefit sharing
can serve the goals of the resettlement policy in those situations of scarcity when sufficient
up-front budgetary resources cannot be fully found and allocated ex-ante. The investments
needed for resettlers’ reconstruction can be increased not only from the up-front budget
allocations to a project, but also on account of the project’s future benefit streams. In 1999, a
study by Van Wicklin found projects that already introduced some benefit-sharing mechanisms,
and argued that this approach is legitimate on four powerful grounds: economic, financial,
moral, and political (Van Wicklin III 1999).
6 Policy support to benefit sharing
In international resettlement policies, benefit sharing is already enunciated in principle,
but in practice this principle has been little applied.
For instance, the World Bank’s policy affirms verbatim the principle of “enabling
resettlers to share in project benefits” (World Bank 1990, 2001). In turn, ADB’s involuntary
resettlement policy requires that ADB projects entailing resettlement “make development not
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only economically but also socially and environmentally beneficial” (ADB 1995) for their
target population and “turn the people dispossessed or displaced into project beneficiaries”
(ADB 2003; Price 2008).
However, in practice, the benefit-sharing policy provisions, when they exist, are far from
being implemented even in many projects that the international agencies co-finance. Such
implementation also depends on the political will of borrowing governments. This is one of
the explanations for why many resettlement project components lack the investment resources
they need to succeed. In most national policies the benefit sharing principle is absent. Several
positive cases will be described further in this chapter. These are what we call advanced
practices, innovative practices, but they are still far from being adopted as general practice in
all developing countries.
Therefore, the room for replication is vast and wide open.
The theoretical rationale for project benefit sharing for financing resettlement rests on
several solid grounds. Benefit-sharing mechanisms:
(1) go a long way toward reducing or preventing the potential risk of impoverishment;
(2) contribute to achieving the overarching goal of reducing poverty;
(3) are economically rational for the project itself, facilitating and speeding up its
execution by reducing delays resulting from resistance or protracted negotiations, which
allows projects to be completed sooner rather than later and to open up the stream of project
benefits earlier;
(4) are equitable, meeting the ethical demand on development to spread benefits widely;
(5) are politically sound and necessary to increase satisfaction and prevent growing
adversity vis-à-vis the project among the surrounding population.
The financing of post-displacement rebuilding through benefit-sharing mechanisms is
slowly being embraced as legitimate and incremental individual compensations paid on a
family-by-family basis. Countries tend to use this mechanism for investing in the welfare of
the relocated groups and their hosts as large collectivities, through area-development programs
around reservoirs.
In sum, the advantage of using economic rents and project benefits is that the financing
necessary to avoid displacees’ pauperization becomes part of the economics of the displacing
project itself. This type of financial capacity can be incorporated from the outset into the
overall project’s economic and financial architecture, easing the pressures on ex-ante
budgetary resources.
7 Political will: Financing is not just a resource matter
The financing of improved resettlement is obviously not just a financial matter. Certainly,
there are always competing demands on the rent and benefits that projects generate. How these
competing demands are prioritized depends, once again, on the ownership of the natural
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resources, on assuming responsibility for causing the displacement, and on political will. The
project owners are those who decide to begin a project predicated on population relocation.
Therefore, the project owners have to will the resources for rectifying the harm and extending
development benefits to those displaced.
The projects in which these issues emerge are of two categories: public sector projects or
private sector for-profit projects. Differences among them are numerous, including significant
differences in decision-making mechanisms.
In public sector projects, the major decisions on benefit allocation are made at the
political level, where priorities are ranked. This is why we define the use of a fraction of
project benefits for sound resettlement as a matter of political will at the state and national or
sub-national levels. Compensation, at least in principle, is not in dispute, because it must be
secured as a matter of property restitution, legally guaranteed by all constitutions. But
compensation alone is insufficient to achieve resettlement objectives, as we argued before.
Allocating an increment of financing – by using a fraction of economic rent and of normal
project benefits – may make the critical difference between failed resettlement with
impoverishment and successful resettlement with development.
The choice is stark, and the outcomes – either way – are predictable.
Given that the historical record of forced displacements is a reliable predictor, the
absence of legislation mandating benefit sharing in public sector projects causing
displacement means, in unambiguous terms, accepting in advance that resettlement will most
likely fail to achieve restoration of livelihoods. Equally starkly, it means not repaying in full
the society’s debt to those expropriated and condoning cost-externalization and
impoverishment.
8 The displaced people as “shareholders”
In public sector projects, the key issue – and the political choice – is not so much about
the principle of re-channeling the economic rent back to the public as it is about the specific
segments of the public to which resources are returned.
The remarkable cases described further down in this paper are of a type regarded as still
“rare” in the hydroelectric sector (Rothman 2000). However rare, they do embody a novel
trend. The new element is that the respective governments have enacted in law explicit
procedures for regularly channeling a percentage of benefits to areas where most of those
displaced and their hosts live. These procedures distinguish the benefits to resettlement areas
from the benefits to electricity consumers of the general public (as lower tariffs). The
examples will show that such distinctions can be made and that these mechanisms chart a
novel path.
Furthermore, these cases also implicitly suggest the feasibility of replicating such
procedures in other public sector projects, not only in hydropower but also in extractive
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industries such as oil, gas and minerals. In fact, delivering the captured economic rent back to
the general public is not in itself a new practice: it has long been used in many countries. What
is novel is the enactment of the priority entitlement of a special sub-group of the public (those
displaced and their hosts) to an earmarked amount. The earmarking of a certain percentage for
the area of populations affected by displacement is a financial and social innovation.
Generalizing the application of these novel mechanisms to an increasing number of projects
and legislating such incremental financing would go a long way in counteracting the risks of
impoverishment.
When private sector corporations own such natural resources-related projects, these
entities capture the same kind of economic rent as a “windfall” gain additional to “normal”
rates of return to investments. The argument for channeling a share of benefits to
reconstruction post-resettlement is therefore similar. If anything, it is even stronger in private
sector projects undertaken for profit because the rent and other benefits are not returned to the
general public but go only to the parties investing in the project.
The capital investors (shareholders) in such companies are entitled to benefits and
dividends because they invested the up-front financing or invest by purchasing shares of these
companies on the stock market. In contrast, the poor smallholders displaced for building such
enterprises cannot afford to invest capital or purchase shares, but the indispensability of their
lands for creating the enterprise makes them an indispensable party, a “stakeholder” in the new
enterprise.
The lands formerly owned by the displaced population are used and “invested” in the
new companies, but the people themselves are bought out and economically excluded through
imposed expropriation. The price they receive in a non-market transaction forced upon them, a
price that carries the label of “compensation”, may, at the very best, be equal to the
replacement value of their land itself as a piece of agricultural land (though in practice it is
often much lower, and they often fail to be recognized as legal owners), but does not pay for
the lands’ developmental potential. What the land purchasers buy are, in fact, the yet unused
opportunities for development embedded in these lands. Without these lands, the new
enterprises would be impossible. This is why the people yielding their lands to the projects can
reasonably be regarded as shareholders. Their contribution is not only their land but also its
development potential, i.e., the opportunity to realize this potential.
The social contract embedded in the principle of land acquisition for development
purposes must involve the obligation of the purchasers (or expropriators) not to worsen the
condition of the land sellers but to enable them also to benefit from the opportunities for
development and improve their livelihood. Since they surrender not just any non-essential,
indifferent good, but the very economic foundation of their pre-project existence, it is this
economic foundation that must be reconstructed.
Because compensation payments up-front are incapable of ensuring reconstruction of this
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foundation, as empirical evidence has proven, mechanisms for access to benefit sharing are
indispensable to securing financing for such reconstruction.
This certainly poses a major theoretical question to the principle of compensation itself,
in social and economic theory, and in policies: why is this principle not explicitly extended to
the lost development opportunity intrinsic in the asset, left uncompensated, instead paying
only for the current value of the undeveloped asset?
The important principle of treating displaced landowners as shareholders requires prudent
translation into practical mechanisms, which have not yet been designed and tested. Clearly,
this principle is not to be understood as just replacing traditional compensation payments with
shares (in the form of paper stocks) in the new company. The principle involves using shares
as a vehicle for incremental support to those displaced, additional to the compensation for
what they lost, and as a form of sharing in the benefits created by developing their land in
order to enable the improvement of their livelihood beyond the pre-project level. In India, in
the wake of recent strong protests against dispossession and flawed compensation (paid by the
state for smallholders and tribal lands transferred to private companies), media reports also
mention some novel approaches. For instance, the JSW Steels Ltd Company expressed
willingness to offer some shares in a new mega-steel plant to be constructed on the land of the
Salboni farmers, who will be displaced by the new company (Guha 2007). Consideration of
payments in the form of shares in the equity of the new firms is also reported from Vietnam as
well (the Vincom group), and from a couple of other countries. However, information on
actual steps taken is still too sketchy for analysis, even though consideration of such
instruments is certainly a new step.
When their land becomes part of the equity of the new enterprise, the displaced people
give up their daily livelihood source. This makes it imperative that an alternative livelihood
source be established immediately, through the offer of alternative land, or of a cash lump sum
for alternative land purchase, and through guaranteed access to employment for the
economically uprooted families in the new enterprise being built. Paper shares cannot be eaten,
and, anyway, the point is not for the displaced to sell and convert the shares into cash as soon
as they receive them. In addition, giving shares to displaced people as an increment toward
full basic compensation, while positive in itself, also exposes the displaced people to a whole
new set of risks related to how the shares will be priced by markets. The displaced people have
no knowledge of how to manage shares in a share market. Therefore, giving out shares is only
one possible means, but the land acquiring company has the obligation to meet the goal
involved in the benefit-sharing principle – namely, effectively improving the incomes, welfare,
and development capacity of the population group whose prior means of production are taken
away (a solution of this kind, applied in Japan, is described in section 9.6).
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9 Types of mechanisms for sharing and conveying benefits
We can distinguish several mechanisms for sharing and reinvesting the benefits in
resettlers’ development. These mechanisms encompass not only the people displaced and
relocated, but also the host populations, who suffer risks and impacts associated with
“hosting”. Resources are allocated and directed to the geographic zone around the hydropower
reservoir, inhabited by both resettlers and hosts.
The seven main mechanisms are:
(1) direct transfers of a share of the revenue streams to finance specific post-relocation
development schemes;
(2) establishment of revolving development funds through fixed allocations, whose
principal is preserved while generating interest used for post-resettlement development;
(3) equity sharing in the new, project-created enterprises (and other productive potentials)
through various forms of co-ownership;
(4) special taxes paid to regional and local governments, additional to the general tax
system, to supplement local development programs with added initiatives;
(5) allocations of electrical power on a regular and legally mandated basis;
(6) granting of preferential electricity cost rates, lower water fees, or other forms of
access to in-kind benefits;
(7) sharing of projects’ non-financial benefits.
Obviously, every mechanism requires legal enactment to ensure implementation over
time and financial accountability. Through legal commitments, the state recognizes its
responsibility in reestablishing the resettlers.
Over the last 10 to 15 years, the adopted regulations have gone through rounds of testing
and repeated refinements, to improve on initial rules. Each country has designated a somewhat
different share of benefits to be invested in developing the resettlement areas. Since these
financial resources are additional to the resources provided as compensation to individual
families, the flows of shared benefits have incremental impacts. In fact, in some countries,
compensation standards have been increased in parallel with enactment of benefit sharing –
for example, in China (see further below). Together, they stimulate post-relocation
development.
In all cases described below, the flows of shared benefits are not limited to a short period:
they are required by law to continue for long periods, sometimes for the life of the enterprises
constructed by the project. The continuity of benefit flows becomes a foundation of long-term
development for those uprooted and relocated.
Brief country-by-country descriptions of such practices follow, after which we will distill
some common characteristics.
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9.1 Colombia: Benefit-sharing through royalty transfers
Starting in the early 1990s, Colombia began allocating a percentage of benefits from
hydropower plants to the development of the areas into which the displaced reservoir
populations were relocated. In 1993 Colombia enacted a legal framework for benefit transfers,
National Law No. 99. It was shortly followed in 1994 by official regulations (“Decree 1993”)
which specified the provisions of the National Law. Two years later, this Decree was
supplemented by National Law No. 344, which created an “Environment Compensation Fund”,
financed through revenue from development projects. Shortly thereafter, the allocations to this
compensation fund were increased to 20% of project revenue.
The Colombian laws also define the proportions of revenues to be returned to the
relocation areas. For instance, 3.8% of the revenue of hydroelectric plants is to be transferred
to the region’s watershed agencies for new productive investments in water saving and local
irrigation, 1.5% of the project revenue must be transferred to the municipalities bordering the
reservoir, and another 1.5% is allocated to upstream municipalities, beyond the reservoir
proper.
These transfers, being mandated by the country’s legislation, must be reported publicly
and are monitorable. Moreover, the laws require that the revenue be used only for the purposes
outlined in the respective laws: these are either social development activities or environmental
protection activities such as watershed maintenance or tree planting. This way, the benefits are
helping to lengthen the lifetime of the hydroelectric plants (e.g. controlling siltation), while
also enhancing the welfare of the area populations (Van Wicklin III 1999; Egre et al. 2008).
9.2 Brazil: Benefit sharing through royalties distribution
Massive investments in hydropower are a pillar of Brazil’s transition from an
underdeveloped country to a middle income country. Enormously rich in natural resources, the
country needs vast electrical power for the industries created to process natural resources,
industries that in turn provide employment for its large population. This is why the country has
embarked over the last 30 years on one of the world’s largest hydropower programs,
comparable to that of China and India.
The multiplication of big reservoirs, however, has led to large displacements. When the
program started, the country was not prepared to appropriately handle such massive
displacements. The early social results were dismal. The affected people were severely
impoverished and many moved anarchically into slums around big towns. National policy
guidelines for regulating displacement and resettlement did not exist and commensurate
financing, apt to address displacement-caused economic distress, was not made available
either. A key political step to redress this somber situation was the Brazilian parliament’s
decision in 1988 to revise the country’s constitution and include in it the principle of
re-investing a percentage of royalties from hydropower in the resettlement areas.
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Subsequent to this constitutional change, Brazil proceeded to adopt, in rapid succession,
a series of laws to translate the new principle into practice by defining entitlements and
specific amounts of transferable royalties, together with procedures for assuring a regular
timetable for such allocations. Moreover, since Brazil is a federation of states, the laws were
adopted at the federal level, to be binding for all of Brazil’s states.
Another task was to define an agreed balance between resource transfers to federal and to
state authorities. Four federal laws to define this balance were adopted in the space of twelve
years, between 1989 and 2000: Law 7990 (in 1989), Law 8001 (in 1990), Law 9433 (in 1997)
and Law 9984 (in 2000) (Gomide 2004; Trembath 2008). From the outset, the policy decision
was to direct the lion’s share of resources – roughly 90% of all royalties from public
hydropower plants – to the states and municipalities and only 10% to federal agencies. For
instance, the laws of 1989 and 1990 specified a distribution of 45% to the overall budgets of
affected states, another 45% to the directly affected municipalities within those states, 8% to
the federal electrical regulatory agency and 2% to the Brazil Ministry of Science and
Technology. Significantly – in order to ensure proper resource management consistent with the
objectives of this special legislation – the laws also mandated how the funds should be further
divided: 40% for the maintenance of electrical services, 35% for water resources management
and data gathering and no less than 25% for environmental protection (Gomide 2004).
Royalties are to be paid throughout the power plants’ lifetime, to help provide for the
long-term “economic sustainability of affected communities” (Gomide 2004; Egre et al. 2008).
Subsequent laws, in 1997 and 2000, took the previous legislation further, nationally regulating
water resource use and introducing payment for the use of reservoir waters. Although the
compensation is set as a very small fraction per MWh of generated power, the aggregate
amount becomes significant.
What have been the results? A 2004 assessment of this program informs us that 137
hydropower plants (which own 145 reservoirs) paid the requisite royalties and financial
compensation to 22 of Brazil’s states and 593 municipalities. Of the latter, 252 municipalities
received financial compensation, 16 municipalities received only royalties, and 325
municipalities received both royalties and compensation. Annually, the amount of financial
compensation and royalties exceeded US $400 million (Gomide 2004).
9.3 China: Benefit sharing for financing development through
resettlement
The early history of unsuccessful DFDR processes, particularly in hydropower, has been
in China a source of many lessons. Some of China’s largest dams were built in the 1960s and
1970s, including Xinanjiang, Sanmenxia and Danjiangkou, each of which displaced more than
300000 people. At that time, the lack of an equitable resettlement policy and inadequate
financing of resettlement led to disastrous impoverishment, deep population resentment, and
political instability.
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China finally learned from failures and radically changed its DFDR policies and
financing practices. Heggelund offers an informed and insightful analysis of the transition
from impoverishing approaches in China’s DFDR to developmental, incomparably better
approaches. China’s authorities, Heggelund wrote, acknowledge that “resettlement has been
unsuccessful due to lack of comprehensive resettlement plans… Emphasis has traditionally
been put on project construction, rather than resettlement…The relocatees were not successful
in restoring their livelihood”. Heggelund is correct in observing that “China’s resettlement
history itself urged the Chinese authorities to think about new alternatives in resettlement
work”.
To gradually overcome the errors of the 1960s and 1970s and their tragic effects on the
population and the national economy, China embarked on a radically different course. Starting
in the 1980s, China began to enact a series of government policies to regulate and improve the
quality of resettlement, increasing its financing in stages. Regulations were passed, first in
1981 with a ministerial decree that directed each power plant to allocate RMB 0.001 per
kilowatt hour to a development fund for investments in the reservoir area throughout the
existence of the power plant itself; then, in 1985, China’s State Council decided to create a
countrywide “Post-Resettlement Development Fund” in which contributions from power
companies would be deposited. That was the beginning of a series of policy and financing
decisions consisting of repeated increases in compensation levels and supplemental investment
above compensation. Given the relevance of these new reforms to the argument put forth in
this study, we discuss them in a special later section on China (section 11).
9.4 Canada: Benefit sharing based on equity Investments
Among industrialized countries, Canada stands out for the magnitude of its hydropower
potential. To exploit this potential, Canada has embarked on a systematic program of building
major dams. Indigenous tribal populations, who have customary land rights recognized under
Canadian law, populate some areas in which many of these dams are being built.
In 1971, HydroQuebec, Canada’s major power utility, announced plans for launching the
James Bay project, which would include the construction of as many as 20 dams (Scudder
2005). The project would have negatively affected the entire homeland of the tribal Cree
Indian population. The Cree organized themselves for military actions, protested intensely, and
resorted to legal action as well. The Canadian courts decided in their favor and stopped project
construction.
The protests of the Cree, who were later joined by the indigenous Inuit populations and
NGOs advocating indigenous and environmental protection, led to significant changes in the
position of the Canadian government and its public utilities.
Recognizing the contribution of this population to the country’s hydroelectric
development in the form of land, Canada’s government and hydroelectric utilities adopted a
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strategy of partnering with the local indigenous communities. HydroQuebec announced that it
would enter into agreements with the affected indigenous groups for equity-sharing in the
envisaged hydropower capacities. The key premise in these agreements is that local
indigenous communities are also direct investors in hydro projects, because they contribute
their lands and their development potential. Equity-sharing was offered in addition to up-front
compensation, paid to the Inuit population for loss of land and for assistance in adjusting their
fishing activities to the new circumstances. This equity stake entitles the tribal Inuit
communities, as partners, to a share of project benefits for the long term proportionate to their
land share in the construction of the project. The power utility provides the full financing and
constructs the dam and power plant, the indigenous population provides the lands, and then
they proportionally share in the profits. This approach avoided the economic displacement of
local communities, and the risks of impoverishment through under-compensated displacement,
by recognizing their shareholding status and financial entitlement to part of the project’s
benefits. This economic and financial arrangement is currently in full operation.
9.5 Norway: Taxation as mechanism for redistribution
Electricity production and export is one of the main branches of the economy of Norway.
Therefore, this country’s response to the same challenge – protecting areas and populations
affected by hydropower projects – is of particular interest.
In contrast to the benefit-sharing mechanisms described above, Norway relies primarily
on tax mechanisms. First, compensation for land lost to reservoirs and for lost access to river
water is paid up-front according to a set of well defined norms and prices. Furthermore, the
benefits harvested by public power companies from producing and selling energy are
recognized as an additional source of financing for the development of areas and populations
affected by hydropower dams. The heavy use of taxation mechanisms contrasts with the
benefit-sharing approaches described above. But while the tools are different, the outcomes
are considerably similar. Norway’s special tax mechanisms result in plowing back substantial
financing for local investment in alternative development, without hampering the production
of clean energy.
The crucial piece of legislation is a relatively new law, adopted in 1997 – the “Power
Taxation Act” – intended to ensure new and higher tax payments from power companies,
which could then be redistributed. The law entitles counties and municipalities to receive three
different types of tax revenue from the power sector. First, all electricity companies must pay a
28% tax on all of their profits. The proceeds from these taxes are distributed in virtually equal
shares to the central budget and to the respective county budget, while 4.75% goes directly to
local municipality. Second, a 0.7% property tax must be paid by the companies to the
municipalities they are located in. Lastly, a tax on the use of natural resources, based on the
average power generated over the previous seven years, is levied and then redistributed at the
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municipal and county levels. The state also collects a tax for the use of natural resources, at a
flat rate, from the companies’ net revenues (Egre et al. 2008).
In addition to the financial transfers through taxation, in-kind benefit sharing is promoted
in Norway as well. Norway requires that electrical companies provide, at their own cost, 10%
of the electricity that they produce to the local municipality. And of course, companies that are
owned by the local governments are required to hand over all dividends to the local owners.
Given Norway’s low population density, displacements of people have historically been
rather limited. Nevertheless, these mechanisms transparently channel substantial finances to
the populations residing in the areas of the hydropower development, whose energy potential
is being exploited by the country at large and who are exposed to the risks of adverse impacts
from such development.
9.6 Japan: Land lease and adding rent to up-front compensation
In an attempt to minimize the tensions and conflicts inherent in land expropriation and
population relocation, Japan has conducted land-leasing experiments and voluntarily abstained
from expropriating lands required for reservoirs.
When the series of three Jintsu-Gawa small dams were built, the Japanese government,
instead of applying the country’s expropriation law, decided to lease the land required for the
reservoirs from its owners (Nakayama and Furuyashiki 2008). Payment for the land lease was
structured as two types of financial transfers, intentionally designed to keep revenue accruing
to the affected people for a long period rather than to make only a one-time compensation
payment before dislocating them. The twin financial transfers consisted of: (1) one payment
up-front to the landowners leasing the reservoir to the state electric companies, to enable these
farmers to develop alternative livelihoods and invest the money received in non-land-based
income-generating activities; and (2) regular rent payments for the leased land, paid
continuously to the local small holders for the life of the project.
This way, the leased land, although now deep under the reservoir waters, remains a
source of constant income for the affected farmers and their children. The regular payments of
rent supplement the initial up-front compensation. They ensure livelihood sustainability for the
former farmers even if their new, alternative economic activities do not succeed from the
outset or do not produce enough.
This twin financing mechanism proved to be an effective risk-preempting mechanism.
The test of time validated it 50 years after the construction of the three Jintsu-Gawa dams.
Nakayama and Furuyashiki (2008) confirmed that the power companies are still paying the
rents. The payments are not a significant burden on the power companies and they accrue to
the new generations of the families of the initial landowners.
Another innovative strategy was envisaged in planning Japan’s large-scale Numata Dam,
whose reservoir was designed to displace some 10000 people. To secure new arable lands for
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this sizeable rural population, the government made plans to convert 15 km2 of dry land on the
slopes of Mount Akagi into padi rice fields, introducing and paying for irrigation. The defined
objective was to achieve physical resettlement with improved livelihoods for the resettled
people. Each resettler was to receive an area approximately twice as large as what he or she
had previously owned. If not all of the land of a certain family was needed for the reservoir,
the government planned to pay rent for the submerged portion as if the land were leased by the
farmers to the state, rather than merely paying a one-time compensation (Nakayama and
Furuyashiki 2008). Both the construction and the resettlement plans were ready for
implementation, but, for other macro-economic reasons, the building of Numata dam was
cancelled. Nonetheless, this original, creative approach in Numata planning is appropriate for
possible testing and replication.
10 Sharing the non-financial project benefits
The reason for describing several ongoing benefit-sharing practices above was to
demonstrate that channeling more financing to displaced populations is not just an utopian,
esoteric ideal. It is realistic, feasible now, and is actually implemented in several countries. But
it is not yet done in the majority of developing countries. The entrenchment of a country in
anachronic practices unfailingly leaves displaced people victimized and unprotected against
impoverishment risks, exactly as outlined by the IRR model. Practice confirms: financial
resources do exist to invest in resettlers’ re-development, distinct from and in addition to the
payment of compensation. Knowledge on where to find these added resources exists as well.
The new patterns are tested and validated by experience. What is missing in countries where
such mechanisms are not favored yet is the political will of the governments responsible for
projects forcibly displacing people. What is also missing is the political power of displaced
people to organize resistance strong enough to obtain better solutions to their displacement
ordeal.
10.1 Irrigated land: options
The mechanisms for accessing project benefits are not confined only to financial
transfers, however important these are. Other options are available, options that are not
financial in form but produce convergent results. What matters is not the form, the
mechanisms of transfer, but the principle we are arguing for: equipping evicted people with
means additional to compensation for socio-economic reconstruction. Other ways of access to
other benefits of the same project are available and must be employed.
Two specific forms of sharing non-financial project benefits are: (1) in the case of
hydropower and irrigation projects, enabling reservoir-displaced people to share in the new
irrigated land in the downstream command area, a method only sporadically employed
worldwide at present; and, (2) in many other projects, giving displaced people priority
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entitlement to employment in the civil works for the new project that displaces them.
The irrigation systems built downstream of dams vastly contribute to increasing
agricultural productivity in the command areas. They enable many farmers to cultivate more
than one crop per year and increase the productivity of each crop. It is therefore only logical to
consider the possibility of resettling at least some of the reservoir farmers, left landless, in the
command area. Of course, once irrigated, downstream lands are more expensive and coveted.
However, farmers who get their land irrigated at no cost to themselves could participate in
sharing their benefits with the farmers upstream who lost their land to make the irrigation
downstream possible.
Such solutions have been considered in the past. India has taken a pioneering position by
adopting legislation – the “ceiling laws” – that makes land redistribution in the command areas
legal and enforceable. Previously rain-fed farms, enabled through irrigation to substantially
increase their productivity, are legally subjected to size-limits, which will still allow an
increase in their productive capacity but will also free up some land for allocation to farmers
who are deprived of their lands. For instance, a farm of about 7.5 acres of rain-fed land could
be limited to only 4 to 5 acres of irrigated land, which would considerably exceed the
production of the former non-irrigated 7.5 acres, while at the same time making 2 to 3 acres
available. At the scale of the entire command area, this produces a substantial amount of
newly irrigated land that could host many displaced farmers.
However, while the ceiling laws exist on India’s legal books, they are not applied in
practice. This important option remains unused and the displaced farmers are not able to share
in this new stream of agricultural benefits from the project that displaced them. It is true
enough that applying such laws is not easy politically, but this could be facilitated if ceiling
limit arrangements and reallocation are agreed upon with communities’ area cultivators before
project dam construction. This assumes that the state must play a strong role in initiating the
process, implementing the laws and protecting the interest of reservoir farmers, rather than
only the interest of the command area farmers. The state not only has the legal leverage but
also the financial leverage necessary to do so. Indeed, it is the public sector that invests vast
finances to build the dam and to construct the irrigation canals in the command area, thus
making irrigation benefits possible. Proper project preparation should include reaching
agreements with downstream farmers before the start of the project, as a condition of
proceeding with the dam-building investment. This option is an excellent avenue for avoiding
impoverishment risks for many displaced upstream farmers, while also bringing large benefits
to farmers downstream.
(1) Land pools. Other options can also be feasible, if the state exercises its role
responsibly and displays political will. Land for displaced farmers can be made available not
only through ceiling laws but also by the state, using project benefits to purchase land which
routinely comes up for sale on the market. Arrangements are possible by instituting the “right
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of first refusal,” the right of the state to be the first purchaser of any privately owned land
coming up for sale. This would enable the formation of land pools, usable for relocating
displaced farmers.
(2) Employment. Providing priority entitlement to jobs in the construction of the new
project is a means of giving those displaced immediate access to an opportunity created by the
project itself to gain income. This can help temporarily substitute for losses of prior means of
production. The “one job per displaced family” option is a well-known mitigation measure and
there is no need to elaborate on it here. Unfortunately, this much-talked-about option is
practiced in only few projects. Many internationally and domestically financed projects do not
exploit this opportunity. The potential of this option is vast and legislation is necessary to
enact much firmer obligations for projects to grant employment and training opportunities
effectively.
In sum, the general idea underpinning the examined solutions is the need for creative
approaches for identifying and using existing options to supplement compensation and
productively resettle farmers. It is not superfluous to repeat, in conclusion, that those forcibly
displaced to make way for development projects should be regarded as among the first entitled
to access the projects’ benefits. Once this principle is accepted, much further groundwork will
have to be laid. Still, identifying the right measures remains a challenge for all project
planners, sponsors and owners. It is their obligation to facilitate the productive reestablishment
of those whom they displace.
10.2 Refuting a false objection to benefit sharing
Pernicious objections to the principle of sharing benefits are made by those opposed to
supplementing compensation on the grounds that those displaced already have access to
benefits from the new projects just because they’re part of the general public. Such objections
must be rejected outright as missing the point. But because they are voiced recurrently, it is
important to stress why such objections are fallacious.
Indeed, the displaced groups are part of the population, and some project benefits
ultimately percolate to them too, mostly in the long or very long run. Yet what the fallacious
arguments miss is the fact that the displaced groups suffer the kind of dispossession,
dislocation and impoverishment that the general population certainly does not endure. They
also miss the hard fact that those displaced have to go through years of enormous efforts to
reconstruct their economic and social situation, an ordeal and a set of risks not imposed on the
“general population.” This is what makes the displaced people different from the general
population. This is also what justifies their priority entitlement to receive, more rapidly than
the general population, a fair share of the benefit stream of the project.
The ex-ante compensation itself is not a share of project benefits: it is nothing other than
simple restitution for the “takings,” and usually unequal to the losses. Denying to displaced
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groups benefit sharing germane to their contributions toward making projects feasible is
nothing less than a hypocritical denial of equity and reality — the reality of the heavy negative
impacts they endure to make the given developments possible.
The country examples described above refer mostly to projects in the hydropower sector,
where displacements tend to be largest and the risks to resettlers very severe. These cases have
proven the availability of additional financial resources for people’s resettlement and
development. In other sectors, where displaced populations may be less numerous,
appropriately tailored benefit-sharing arrangements are not only possible, but may also be
easier to carry out, given smaller affected groups.
Similar resources are generated in other kinds of development projects, particularly in
other branches of extractive industries. All development projects, even those that do not
generate a windfall economic rent, pursue the generation of a benefit stream and the highest
possible returns to capital. What is most important is to accept that the principle of benefit
sharing in all categories of projects is a crucial, fair principle, and that political will and legal
regulation to implement it are indispensable. As a percentage, the benefits allocated to
displaced groups are still a relatively limited fraction of the total project benefits. But these
allocations make a big difference in restoring and improving the welfare of displaced
populations. The specific forms and proportions can also vary.
It is up to policy makers, planners, or project managers, in consultation with those
affected, to design the appropriate grammar of redistribution rules and procedures for
translating this principle into effective practical use in each country context.
11 China’s innovative twin approach: Higher up-front
compensation and additional ex-post financing
Financing resettlers’ development through ex-post approaches should not become a
perverse incentive to underpay the required up-front compensation (restitution) for losses,
which is the first ex-ante payment (in kind, in cash, or both) towards recovery. This would
undermine the purpose of both compensation and benefit-sharing.
By the mid- and late 1980s, China had started to move towards a far-reaching shift in
resettlement policy. China’s government announced that, based upon 30 years of experience,
the country must change a resettlement policy focused primarily on people’s physical transfer
into a developmental resettlement policy. In terms of financing resettlement, the key change
was to move from state subsidies only for compensation to additional investment by the state
to support the introduction of new development activities, as well as new productive capacities
to gainfully employ the masses of farmers separated from their lands. The formal acceptance
of the new concept – “resettlement with development” or “developmental resettlement” – was
introduced in 1991 in the special policy guidelines for the Three Gorges Project.
To unify existing parallel laws and regulations as well, China adopted in 1986 the “Land
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Administration Law” (LAL), which placed explicit emphasis on limiting excessive land
acquisition and forced displacement of people. The LAL was reexamined and improved again
in August 1998 by the National People’s Congress. The revised law considerably restricted the
authority of China’s provincial governments and of counties to requisition land on behalf of
the state. As distinct from Land Acquisition Acts in other countries, China’s 1998 Land Law
contains explicit norms for people’s sustainable resettlement, rather than only procedures for
how to acquire their lands. The Law’s objectives are defined in terms of helping resettlers to
develop new forms of livelihood and productive activities.
Furthermore, over the last two decades, China has increased in several successive stages
the financing for compensation of the displaced populations. After its initial costly mistakes,
China made consistent policy and financial efforts to supplement the improvements in ex-ante
compensation financing by adding the kind of ex-post benefit sharing described above. A
series of policy decisions reflect this approach, repeatedly improving not only the norms for
ex-post benefit sharing, but also the state-mandated norms for ex-ante compensation. This
enables the financing of resettlement, in a colorful Chinese metaphor, to simultaneously
“advance on two legs.” That these twinned policies have financial substance, and are not just
flourishing metaphors, is demonstrated by the concomitant allocation of huge amounts of
financing.
This new policy and financial efforts are informed by systematic research. China has
established the world’s first national research center on development-caused resettlement
(NRCR) at Hohai University, specialized in resettlement policies, research, planning,
implementation, and monitoring, as well as a large decentralized network of other resettlement
institutions in all provinces. The repeatedly revised and strengthened resettlement regulations
in China have also gradually tightened the restrictions on land expropriation, reflecting the
central authorities’ intent to reduce the loss of arable lands, reduce abusive land seizures and
recognize the peasants’ protests against them by limiting the aggregate size of involuntary
resettlements.
11.1 Four distinct sets of financial instruments
China’s rapid industrialization, urban development, and agricultural changes continue to
require massive DFDR processes, and the country’s high population density and scarcity of
arable land compounds the difficulties of resettlement. The set of recent financial reforms for
DFDR legislated in China over the last 3 to 4 years are directly relevant to the themes of
enhancing compensation, financing, investment and benefit sharing discussed in this paper,
and their ultimate policy objective is to achieve resettlement with development. They also
contain rich lessons of experience for other developing countries facing comparable DFDR
issues. Some of these reforms are very recent (end of 2006) and there is still little information
about their unfolding, but the economic rationale and the practical relevance of these reforms
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deserve careful review.
Four clusters of financial measures can be distinguished in China’s approaches, all
relevant to the conceptual and operational dilemmas discussed in this study. These are:
(1) measures to radically upgrade the nation’s basic land compensation system for all
families and communities uprooted by development projects and increase the restitutionary
ex-ante financing for lost land and assets;
(2) measures to supplement the ex-ante compensations with ex-post financing via
targeted investments in area development to create a functional economic platform for those
whose prior production systems were dismantled by relocation;
(3) measures to increase the self-investing capacity of resettlers by transferring
incremental financing additional to that described in points (1) and (2) directly to resettled
families and giving resettlers a choice of using the proceeds either for consumption or for
productive investments (or both);
(4) measures to retroactively correct past under-compensation of displaced people.
All these measures inject additional financing either with a safety net function or as an
ex-post remedial investment.
Some of these recent reforms are innovations not just for China itself; they are
unprecedented in the international practice of DFDR processes. Their diversity and their
financial magnitude express China’s lucid recognition of the socio-economic and the political
importance of sound resettlement, as well as of the risks and inevitable effects of failure. Some
of these measures are not yet applied in all of China’s economic sectors; the water resources
sector is ahead of other sectors. Preparation for further legislation appears to continue.
Other important measures converge and have, by law, a distinct source of funding. We
may lump such measures under the “capability development” concept proposed by Amartya
Sen, on which the author do not elaborate in this paper, but which is germane to the effort to
improve resettlers’ livelihoods. For instance, the training of resettlers is a mandated obligation
for all projects in China, and by law they are to be financed with at least 1% of the
resettlement cost. The emphasis on training is linked to the Chinese strategy of resettlement
with development, predicated on the simultaneous planning and financing of new economic
capacities in the areas earmarked as host sites (e.g., new industrial enterprises, irrigation and
roads), intended to create job opportunities for the incoming, resettling population.
The four types of measures outlined above are as follows:
(1) Reform of compensation norms. Land compensation for land losses has been paid
in China starting from the early 1950s. In retrospect, the author distinguish two stages in the
history of China’s compensation curve: the 1953 to 1985 period and the period from 1986 to
2006 (to date).
During the first stage, lasting more than 30 years, compensation for land was kept at very
low levels; within this stage it was, in fact, decreased by almost half. From the early initial
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range set in 1953 at 3 to 5 times the annual output value (AOV) per unit of land, the
compensation was reduced in 1958 to only 2 to 4 times the AOV per unit of land. It stayed at
this lowest level for over 25 years, from 1958 to 1985 (Figure 1; Shi et al. 2006). This period
is now critically reassessed by China’s policy makers as one of erroneous approaches to
DFDR; the affected people were severely impoverished by displacements and had little legal
recourse to defend their entitlements and rights.
Figure 1 Land compensation in China: Policy provisions and minimum and maximum levels
The turnaround in compensation policy began in the mid-1980s. The compensation range
for land more than doubled in 1985, from 2 to 4 times the AOV to 5 to 20 times the AOV, and
then increased again several times.
Also, the 1986 decision made it illegal to compensate farmland below 5 times the AOV
and gave local administrations the authority to use higher levels, up to 20 times the AOV. But
the bottom level of the range was still very low. A decade later, in 1999, the compensation
rates for the lowest level were doubled, with the option of paying as high as 30 times the
annual output.
China’s current calculation of compensation is based on the actual output of land, which
produces a much more generous compensation than conventional calculations based only on
farmers’ income returns per unit of land. The value of a farm’s annual output is always much
higher than the farmer’s net income from the land, since it includes the cost of inputs and labor.
Net income from the annual crop is only about 50% of total output value. This means that
compensation that is equal to 20 times the AOV is in fact equal to a farmer’s real income for a
40-year period (per unit of land). Similarly, a compensation level of 30 times the AOV is equal
to a farmer’s net income for 60 years. In parallel, China has revised and tightened land-taking
procedures.
In 2004, the maximum compensation level for land in urban and peri-urban areas was
raised to 40 times the AOV, much above other land categories. Shortly thereafter, China’s
State Council decided to also raise the minimum permissible compensation from 10 to 16
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times the AOV for farmland acquired by water resources projects. The mandated higher
minimum floor makes it illegal in China to pay farmers less than this minimum. The aim of
raising the floor is to prevent local attempts to keep compensation close to the lower levels of
the range (it was previously 10 times the AOV).
The increased levels of mandatory compensation act also as a disincentive and restraint
to excessive land acquisition and displacement. Other legislative measures converge: a
comprehensive land law was adopted first in 1986, and revised in August 1998 by the Ninth
National People’s Congress. As distinct from land acquisition acts in other countries, China’s
1998 Land Law contains explicit support for sustainable resettlement.
China is probably the only country that has instituted a legal prohibition against
compensating the land below a certain level. Recent legislation (State Council of PRC 2006a,
2006b) has limited the authority of local governments (particularly the counties) to expand
land acquisition – an authority that these local governments have tended to overuse, causing
peasants’ protests. This interdiction is directed against abuses committed by local officials who,
in several places, distorted the policy in two ways: they took excessive land out of agriculture
and they used very low valuation levels in order to pay less compensation to affected farmers.
That was both contrary to policy and contrary to peasants’ interest. In many places, the
peasants strongly protested land takings. Official statistics reflect, year after year, a growing
number of rural unrest incidents and local conflicts, involving both peasants and workers:
reported unrest incidents have grown from 8700 in 1993 to 32 000 in 1999 and to over 87000
in 2005 (Yu 2007). The single most frequent cause of such local conflicts and events of unrest
is related to land. The changes in China’s policies aim, among other goals, to curb excessive
land seizures and the aggregate size of forced displacements by instituting both legal limits
and financial disincentives to local authorities.
(2) Investment financing after relocation. Once the reform of compensation levels
started in 1986, China began in parallel to adopt measures for investing in resettlers’
post-relocation development. The source for this financing was the benefits from generated
electricity (as in Brazil and Columbia, described earlier). The vehicles for this are the
“Development Funds” introduced first in the hydropower sector. The “Development Funds”
add investments through ex-post benefit sharing, complementing the higher ex-ante
compensation and allowing the “financing to advance on two legs.” The relevant measures are
several regulations from the 1980s, starting with the decree of the Ministry of Finance and of
the Ministry of Electric Power that required each power plant to allocate a tiny fraction per
kilowatt hour to investments in the reservoir area for the life of the power plant. In 1991,
China’s State Council decided also to create a national “Post-Resettlement Development
Fund” in which contributions from power companies would be deposited.
The relative downside of development funds targeted to an impacted area is that the
additional financing is only partly managed by the resettlers themselves, at the level of the
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family unit; a large part tends to be used by programs managed by local authorities’ area-based
interventions. For activities resettlers might initiate themselves, other measures were adopted
that enable self-investment.
(3) Measures for financing resettlers’ self-investments. A wholly new financing
instrument was introduced in the economics of DFDR in China through legislation adopted by
the State Council in 2004 and 2006. This consists of an annual allowance (grant) of RMB 600,
equivalent to US $75 per year per capita, to be paid after relocation by the state to every
individual involuntarily resettled, for a period as long as 20 years after the date of physical
relocation. Recipients will be able to invest this new financial resource for productive
purposes or use it for consumption needs.
Retirement support and pensions for old people who are displaced is not an issue usually
considered with respect to displaced populations. However, China’s recent legislation
introduces another new principle in this respect, which is an innovation compared also with
current international standards for resettlement policy. The new Chinese legislation recognizes
that displacement causes a particularly sharp loss of security for people of old age who have
been farmers most of their lives and whom displacement may leave without any land. This
situation is quite common in many countries, where it affects countless former farmers who
end up as slum dwellers around major cities.
For older farmers who are left without land and become urban citizens, China’s new
decision provides for the introduction of a “safety net” measure: payments toward a “Social
Security Fund”, comparable in its effects to a retirement pension (State Council of PRC 2006a,
2004; Shi et al. 2006; MLSS 2007).
This new financial instrument may be seen, in conceptual terms, either as a
straightforward vehicle for decentralized development investment or as a generalized safety
net, of the type envisaged by Kanbur (2008). Empirical research on how this instrument works
out operationally will be necessary, beyond its legal description. But, either way, this
instrument appears to be an important financial innovation aimed at injecting massive
resources towards the improvement of resettlers’ economic status and capacities.
(4) Financial measures for rectifying past under-payments. Coupled with the open
recognition of under-financing errors committed earlier in China’s resettlement practices, the
decisions to channel more financing towards investing in reconstruction led to another step.
China’s State Council, concerned with the lingering effects of past failures in income
restoration, adopted legislation to rectify past under-financing through retroactive payments to
tens of millions of people displaced in the past 5 decades (State Council of PRC 2006a,
2006b).
Compared with current international standards, this is an extraordinary policy change,
unprecedented in any other country. Specifically, an annual sum of 600 yuan (US $75) per
capita will be retroactively paid by the state during the period of 2006 to 2026 to all farmers
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displaced by dams between 1949 and 2006. (This incremental payment alone almost equals
the full annual income of a person at the poverty line, set in China at 682 RMB/year). For a
peasant family of 4, the inflow of RMB 2400/year every year for 20 years is very significant.
Overall, the financial outlays for retroactive payments are indeed huge. Data from
China’s National Research Center of Resettlement (NRCR) put the number of dam-displaced
people between 1949 and 2006 at about 18 million, which over 20 years will entail retroactive
payments totaling US $27 billion, about 210 billion RMB. Yet the total number of
beneficiaries will be even larger than the 18 million originally displaced. The adopted
legislation takes into account the natural growth rate of the formerly displaced populations and
extends the corrective measure to all current members of the displaced families who have been
born after displacement. This increases the number of beneficiaries from the 18 million
mentioned above to about 22.88 million people. The retroactive payments will total US $34.3
billion.
The way China secures the financial resources for such additional financing is by asking
the society in its entirety to respond to resettlers’ sacrifices and needs. Just before enacting the
September 2006 measures, the government announced that additional financing for the people
displaced by dams would be covered through a very small increase in the cost of a kilowatt
hour (0.025 yuan, or less then one third of one cent). Of this additional aggregate hydropower
revenue, 40% would be returned to benefit the farmers displaced and resettled (by direct
deposit into personal accounts set up for them). This is both an act of self-correction and
reparation for past losses, as well as a modality of continuous state investment in developing
the capabilities of tens of millions of displaced people – to our knowledge not applied by any
other state. In terms of our general argument in this paper, this is noteworthy as a new and
additional transfer mechanism for investing in redevelopment after dislocation. It diversifies
China’s range of financial and legal tools for resettlement.
The cumulative implementation of China’s reforms described above will continuously
inject large incremental financing, every single year, into the economy of populations affected
by past and future DFDR operations for hydropower projects. The conventional form of
ex-ante compensation has ceased to be, in China, the single mechanism for financing
resettlers’ reestablishment. The new tools are topping off compensation with outright
investments in resettlement in multiple forms.
The problems faced by China in DFDR, which have led to the adoption of such major
reforms towards financing resettlement with development, are not, however, challenges
limited to China alone. The measures described above are certainly China-specific, but the
causes that led to them are not. The basic issues in development-triggered displacements are
virtually universal in the developing world and require country-specific solutions and reforms
in every country, adjusted to the conditions of every country and tailored for maximizing
effectiveness.
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12 Main conclusions on benefit sharing and investments in
DFDR
In closing this extended examination, several conclusions invite emphasis.
(1) Impoverishment is not prevented by compensation alone. The experience of
countless development projects and their DFDR processes shows that impoverishment is
frequent and recurrent in most projects despite the payment of compensation. The author must
inescapably conclude that the values extracted through expropriation are not restituted
adequately through compensation alone. Costs are largely externalized. As long as
resettlement processes remain chronically under-financed, DFDR processes will chronically
and predictably fail and further pauperize those affected.
(2) Compensation must be restructured and increased. While compensation remains
indispensable in DFDR, its levels, calculation, and delivery must be radically restructured and
improved.
(3) Additional financing for sound resettlement is indispensable. The insufficiencies
of financing cannot be corrected by only reforming compensation levels and processes,
although such reform is essential and a priority. Additional financing is indispensable because
the very goals of sound resettlement require not only restitutionary financing but also
development-investment financing.
(4) Additional financing depends on political will. Resource allocation for DFDR
processes is a matter of political will even before becoming a matter of finance availability.
Allocation is a matter of distribution. Project benefit sharing cannot be enacted by project
managers themselves; it requires political decisions at high levels of national governments or
at high levels of the private sector, corporate management and ownership. At the state level,
the rethinking of the place of DFDR processes in a specific country’s development and
poverty reduction policy means not just tinkering with piece-meal, marginal measures. It
requires recognizing and addressing the political economy issues of DFDR and determination
to reform legislation, policy approaches, and the patterns of financing economic recovery after
relocation.
(5) Financing resources are available. The practices of several countries discussed
above demonstrate beyond doubt that resources can be mobilized, when there is political will.
The fact that such mechanisms are being crafted and implemented not only in industrialized
countries, but also in developing countries, is the best response to the question we mentioned
at the beginning of this paper: “where will the money come from?” The response is clear: the
financial resources for resettlement can be enhanced not only ex-ante, through budgetary
allocations for correct compensation before inception, but also by mobilizing resources that
become available due to the project itself, ex-post. The need for fully overcoming
displacement’s dysfunctions and for sharing the fruits of development is strong and
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long-lasting. Projects’ ability to provide benefits for restoring the livelihood of those displaced
would provide a good practical test of the claims made about their profitability and
justification. As Jean Drèze pointed out, if development projects that displace people “are as
profitable as their promoters claim, (they) …should have little difficulty in offering displaced
persons an irresistible resettlement package” (Drèze 1994).
(6) Growing opposition to displacement and its impact. Strong opposition to
displacement and to under-compensation that cause impoverishment is expanding in many
countries. In India alone, the massive solidarity movement triggered by the killings of people
resisting displacement at Kalinga Nagar, Singur, and Nandigram in 2006 and 2007 epitomizes
such resistance. It appears that the strength of resettlers’ demands and their militant opposition
are increasingly forcing government decisions and resource allocation in private-sector
projects toward more recognition of resettlers’ losses and impoverishment.
(7) Multiple investment mechanisms are available. The benefit-sharing mechanisms
described in the paper are partly different and partly overlapping, but all have one purpose in
common: to transfer financial resources to the resettlers as resources additional to
compensation payments. Different procedures reflect country particularities, history, culture,
and preferences. The differences suggest that there is not necessarily a “one prescription- fits-
all” solution. But there is a vast space for replication, adaptation, and creative innovations,
open to many other countries.
(8) Policies require legislative enactment. The country experiences examined above
demonstrate the need for more than policy statements. To ensure long-term consistency in
implementation, transparency for the public, and legal accountability of managers and
implementers, the policy decisions for better financing of DFDR were translated into law. In
most cases, governments enacted legislation to enforce systematic application and compliance.
Laws enable legal recourse in cases of transgression. The legislation described above also
specified the proportions of sharing among various stakeholders, in an effort not to leave
distribution to chance or subjective decisions. The laws also prescribed specific uses of the
financial allocations to prevent distortions of the new regulations. Adopted laws were, in turn,
subsequently revised and strengthened, based on lessons from their initial application.
The answer to our fundamental question is that compensation alone cannot prevent
impoverishment: it must be enhanced, to become fairer, and it must be supplemented by
investments for development. If used alone, its corollary for the countless people affected is
impoverishment, not development. Maintaining unchanged the current financing patterns
based on compensation alone would only mean financing for repeating past failures in
different forms. It will predictably cause further impoverishment. Financing is in itself a factor
of such paramount importance for achieving economically sustainable resettlement that, when
it is flawed, it causes failure even if other necessary factors of success are present. Other
variables of DFDR policies must be changed as well. Money alone will not solve all of
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resettlement’s problems either, but absence of financially adequate compensation foreordains
failure by definition. Reform is indispensable and possible in the ways resettlement operations
are legislated, planned, financed, and implemented. And with political will, the means
necessary for investing in resettlement with development can be mobilized.
It is not superfluous to repeat, in ending, that the people placed at grave risk and forcibly
displaced to make way for development projects ought to be seen as among the first entitled to
access the substantial benefits that their ordeal makes possible.
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